Although the theory of Conceptual Structures is over 10 years old, basic notions (like canonical graphs) are far from settled and are subject to constant extensions and reformulations. However, most of these are done in an informal way, which doesn't help in clarifying the issues involved. It is our hope that this paper will provide a rst step towards the complete and rigorous account of Conceptual Structures (CS) Theory, which is needed for ongoing standardization and implementation e orts.
Introduction
The \bible" of Conceptual Structures Theory is 16], which appeared over 10 years ago. As Sowa himself recognizes 1 , 16] is written in a tutorial style, which means that several concepts introduced early in the text weren't updated in later sections. Furthermore, the informal and incomplete formulation of several de nitions has led to many questions about the theory, even about some of its fundamental aspects, as the CG mailing list testi es.
Also, since its rst appearance, the theory has undergone multiple changes and extensions due to the work of a growing scienti c community. Although many of the concepts and notations introduced are motivated by speci c application domains (like the analysis of tense in a discourse), several recent papers (like 2, 17, 19, 6, 18, 11, 15, 5, 14, 8] ) deal with the abstract theory itself. Finally, the emergence of the ANSI IRDS standard 13], the KIF language 7], and the PEIRCE workbench 4] has made it clearer that it is about time to have a precise and complete de nition of the core theory.
Slightly revised and corrected version of a paper that appeared in the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Conceptual Structures, College Park MD, USA, 16{20 August 1994, Lecture Notes in Arti cial Intelligence 835, Springer-Verlag. 1 Unless otherwise stated, all personal opinions and statements were expressed in messages sent to the CG mailing list | send a message to cg-request@cs.umn.edu to subscribe it.
For all these reasons, we have proposed ourselves to give a formal account of the basic notions of Conceptual Structures Theory. It is our hope that this paper will clarify some issues, and provide a basis for the future standards' documentation, as well as serving as a guideline for implementors.
We use examples from published papers in order to show how the framework we de ne incorporates the informal notions presented in those papers. We assume the reader has been previously exposed to CS theory, e.g. as presented in 16] or 17]. Whenever we write Assumption (or Theorem or De nition) x:y:z we are referring to 16].
Overview
The proposed framework, to be detailed in the remaining sections, can be brie y summarized as follows. There is a set of concept type lattices, one for each order. First-order types denote sets of individuals, while nth-order types represent sets of (n?1)th-order types. Furthermore there are relational concept lattices, one for each possible order. Intuitively, an nth-order relational concept type represents a set of nth-order relation types, and a nth-order relation type denotes a set of nth-order relations, which are relations having at least one argument which is a (n ?1)th-order relation. In particular, rst-order relations have as arguments only concepts.
As we want to use conceptual graphs as the meta-language, we must be able to talk about types as individuals. Therefore, for each concept type and for each relational concept type there will be a corresponding individual marker. Of course, there will be also individual markers that denote the individual objects of the domain of discourse. Adding a generic marker and an absurd marker, it is possible to obtain marker lattices. Having types and markers (also called referents), it is possible to de ne concepts, which are tuples consisting of a concept type and a referent, and relations, which are tuples consisting of a relation type and concepts (called the arguments of the relation). As types and referents are organized in lattices, concepts (and therefore relations) also form lattices.
This makes the formalism more regular and facilitates the de nition of the canonical formation rules, which enable the derivation of new graphs from given ones. The canonical basis is a set of graphs which state for each relation what are its possible arguments. Therefore, canonical graphs (those derived from the canonical basis) are guaranteed to obey the selectional constraints.
Notation
We assume the reader is familiar with some of the usual mathematical terminology and symbology, especially regarding ordered sets. We also use^for the logical conjunction and _ for the disjunction, but the intended use is always clear from the context. for any partially ordered set S, the symbol designates the partial order, and the following equivalences apply: x y , y x, x < y , x y^x 6 = y, x > y , x y^x 6 = y; t 1 ; : : :; t n <t 0 1 ; : : :; t 0 m is a compact notation to state that for each possible combination of i = 1; : : :; n and j = 1; : : :; m one has t i < t 0 j .
In order to use few symbols and subscripts, we will overload functions when there is no possibility of confusion. For example f : A ! B and f : C ! D means that f(x) returns an element of B if x 2 A and that f(x) 2 D if x 2 C. We always guarantee that A and C are disjoint domains to avoid any misunderstanding. Unless otherwise stated, all functions that we will de ne are total.
Types and Individuals
In 17], Sowa shows the need for higher-order types, and notes that they can't be all put into the same hierarchy in order to avoid paradoxes. We therefore begin by generalizing the single ( rst-order) type hierarchy of Assumptions 3.2.3 and 3.2.5 to several hierarchies, each of a di erent order. As usual, we also assume the hierarchies to be lattices, which has computational advantages. Furthermore, as the type hierarchies will have to be speci ed by the user, we will assume niteness. Assumption 1. There is a nite set T C = fT 1 ; : : :; T n g of nite concept type lattices.
In the following, we will always use the variable n to denote the highest occurring order, i.e., n = jT C j. Next Again, in the following we will always use m to denote the highest occurring order of relational concept types, i.e. m = jT RC j. We will furthermore adapt to relational concept types the nomenclature used for concept types.
De nition 4. For each i 2 f1; : : :; mg R i is the hierarchy of ith-order relational (concept) types; top(R i ) is the ith-order universal relational (concept) type; bottom(R i ) is the ith-order absurd relational (concept) type. where TRANSITIVE might be de ned by the graph in Example 2. Furthermore, notice that if we want to talk about second-order dyadic relations, we will have to use another type, say DYADIC-2, which will be a member of R 2 .
Finally we need relation type hierarchies. The basic idea is to classify relation types according to their arity and order. A relation of arity i (also called an i-adic relation) is a relation with exactly i arguments. Similar to higher-order functions, an (i + 1)th-order relation is a relation that has at least one argument which is an ith-order relational concept. This means that there must be m+1 relation type orders, since there are m relational concept type orders.
According to Assumptions 3.2.7 and 3.6.13 all ( rst-order) relations are in a single hierarchy whose top element is the dyadic relation LINK. However, in the rest of 16] the relation hierarchy is never put to use. Moreover, the exact meaning of something like BETW < LINK, where BETW is triadic while LINK is dyadic, remains unclear. This explains that (to our knowledge) no one has ever precisely de ned the concept of \relation restriction" | even 14] doesn't deal with the arity issue | although it is often said that LINK may be restricted to any other relation type.
For these reasons we don't put all relations of the same order into the same hierarchy. Instead, each hierarchy contains all relations with the same signature (i.e. order, arity, and arguments' orders). Therefore, relation r can be a subrelation of relation r 0 (written r r 0 ) only if r and r 0 have the same signature.
Assumption 5. There is a nite set T R of nite relation type lattices R hx 1 ;:::;x d i such that for each lattice d 1 and the signature hx 1 ; : : :; x d i is unique, where x i 2 T C T RC for each i 2 f1; : : :; dg. Inversely, each element of T C T RC must occur in the signature of at least one relation type lattice.
The last restriction ensures that every imaginable (relational) concept can be linked to at least one relation in a conceptual graph (see Section 3). Next we de ne the order of a relation as the successor of the maximal order of its relational arguments.
De nition 6. The function order : S R hx 1 ;:::;x d i ! IN that returns for each relation type its order is de ned as order(r) = 1 + max(fjj9i 2 f1; : : :; dg such that x i = R j g) with the understanding that max(fg) = 0. The set of all relation types of order k will be written as R k .
Due to the last requirement of Assumption 5, it is possible to write the set of all relation types as S m+1 k=1 R k , since the existence of mth-order relational concept types implies the existence of (m + 1)th-order relations.
Notice that R i and R i mean di erent things. The former is the set of all ith-order relation types, while the latter is the lattice of all ith-order relational concept types. The formal notation may seem rather confusing, but is in fact quite intuitive. Let us see some examples. Example 4. Of all elements of T R , the lattice R hT 1 ;T 1 i is probably the largest one, as it includes the relation types that most frequently occur in Conceptual Graphs papers, namely those of rst-order dyadic relations between rst-order concept types. For example, most of the relations of the Conceptual Catalog in 16, Appendix B.3], like AGNT, LOC, OBJ, and PART, belong to that hierarchy and LINK is its top element.
Example 5. The lattice R hT 1 ;T 2 i of all relations whose rst argument is a rst-order concept and whose second argument is a second-order concept includes both KIND and CHRC as used in 17] . Notice that although CHRC is de ned in terms of KIND, one has KIND < CHRC because KIND denotes a special characteristic of an individual: its type. Example 6. A typical member of R hR 1 ;R 1 i is INVERSE-OF, a second-order relation between two rst-order relations. Example 7. The relation ATTR that appeared in Example 2 should not be confused with the one that appears in BALL]->(ATTR)-> RED]! The latter relates two rst-order concepts while the former involves a relation (more precisely, a relational concept). Therefore, the latter is an element of R hT 1 ;T 1 i while the relation of Example 2 belongs to R hR 1 ;T 1 i . To distinguish such cases, we will use labels like ATTR-T1-T1 and ATTR-R1-T1.
It is obvious that no type can be of two di erent orders, nor can it be simultaneously of two di erent kinds (e.g. a concept type and a relation type).
Now that we have all types we need, we can give them a semantics. For that purpose, a domain is needed. Theorem 11. For any L 2 T C T R T RC and any x; y 2 L the following holds: (x^y) (x) \ (y) (x) (y) (x _ y)
Proof. Using Assumption 10 and some well-known lattice properties, one gets (x^y) x ) (x^y) (x) and (x^y) y ) (x^y) (y) x (x _ y) ) (x) (x _ y) and y (x _ y) ) (y) (x _ y)
which imply the theorem's statements. The denotation of some type is a set of other types treated as individuals. To be able to use Conceptual Graphs as a meta-language, we must provide for individual markers that correspond to the individuals in the universe of discourse. Therefore, we must extend the single set of individual markers of Assumption 3.3.1 to multiple sets, one for each di erent order. Furthermore, the individual markers should re ect the ordering of the types they correspond to. For this purpose we will re ne the and operators that were presented informally in 18] to map the meta-level to the instance level.
Assumption 12. There is a set I C = fIC 1 ; : : :; IC n g of individual concept marker sets such that IC 1 is nite, there is an injective function : IC 1 ! I, and for each i 2 f2; : : :; ng there is an isomorphism : IC i ! T i?1 .
Notice that due to the isomorphism and to Assumption 1, IC i is a nite lattice for i 6 = 1. Moreover, any set can be viewed as a partially ordered set with the antichain order (x y , x = y). This means that all members of I C are nite posets, a necessary condition for the order-embedding of Assumption 15. Furthermore, an isomorphism is an injective function. This implies that all mappings are one-to-one, which is equivalent to the commonly used Unique Name Assumption (i.e., di erent markers represent di erent individuals of the domain).
Example 9. Assumption 3.3.1 states that the elements of IC 1 are #1, #2, : : : . However, since we provide several marker sets, and according to general usage, we will use more readable labels, like #John, #Moby-Dick, etc. Example 10. In an actual implementation, there may be a default mapping #x ! X to spare the user from tedious typing. For example (#person) = PERSON, where #person 2 IC 2 because PERSON 2 T 1 .
Since the domain includes relations, we must also provide individual markers for them. They will be used in the referent eld of relational concepts, which implies that there can only be m sets of such markers, not m + 1.
Assumption 13. There is a set I R = fIR 1 ; : : :; IR m g of individual relation marker sets such that for each i 2 f1; : : :; mg there is an isomorphism : IR i ! R i .
Notice that each IR i is a nite poset whose top elements are the markers that correspond to the top elements of the ith-order relation type hierarchies. Example 11. According to Examples 4 and 5 one has in IR 1 both #agnt < #link and #kind < #chrc, but #kind is unrelated to #link, which is one of the top elements of IR 1 .
Example 12 (adapted from 17] ). An implemented system may provide a default mapping which can be overruled by the user. For instance, (#greater-than) = GREATER-THAN unless the user explicitly states that (#greater-than) = >. Now that the whole domain is covered, we introduce as in 11] an absurd marker which together with the usual generic marker enables us to classify the markers into lattices, as proposed in 15]. Notice that M = S n i=1 IC i S m j=1 IR j f*, *g. Furthermore, since each IC i is a nite lattice for i > 1, it is bounded and therefore has a top and a bottom element. This means that the only marker directly beneath the generic marker in CM i is top(IC i ) and conversely bottom(IC i ) is the only marker above the absurd marker.
The conformity relation presented in Assumption 3.3.3 states which markers may be combined with which concept types. However, Assumption 3.3.3 is self-contradictory if taken literally. It states that (1) no individual marker may conform to the absurd type, and (2) if a marker conforms to two di erent types, it must conform to their maximal common subtype. We get a contradiction when the maximal common subtype is the absurd type. An obvious solution is to require as in 2] that no individual marker may conform to incompatible types. Our approach will be not to assume (2) .
In our formalization, we make it clear that the conformity relation is just the explicitation of the denotation function. In fact, the assertion \#John conforms to PERSON" is equivalent to \John is a person" which formally means that the individual corresponding to the name John is a member of the denotation of the type PERSON. Having this relationship enables us to de ne the conformity relation in a much more compact, elegant, and general way than However, the most important di erence between our Assumption 16 and Assumption 3.3.3 is that we don't require t :: m and t 0 :: m to imply (t^t 0 ) :: m. The reason is that it would amount to say that (t^t 0 ) = (t) \ (t 0 ). This is what is called the latticetheoretic interpretation of a type hierarchy 1]. Intuitively, it means that for every pair of compatible types their intersection must be represented by an explicit type, even if it is not conceptually relevant. Therefore, the order-theoretic interpretation given by Theorem 11 is more appropriate for AI applications, as the next example shows. In other words, although CHURCH::#st-mary and OLD-BUILDING::#st-mary, we don't have HISTORIC-LANDMARK::#st-mary. 3 Assumption 27. A simple conceptual graph is a nite, bipartite, connected graph hV C ; V R ; Ei such that V C is a non-empty bag of concepts, V R is a bag of relations, and E is a subset of V C V R satisfying 8c 2 V C 8r 2 V R hc; ri 2 E , 9i 2 IN arg(r; i) = c
Notice that if V R is empty, then V C contains a single concept; otherwise the graph wouldn't be connected.
Canonical Graphs
A conceptual graph only imposes a minimum of meaningfulness. It is always well-formed in the sense that the concepts linked to a relation must conform to the relation's signature, but there are no other conditions. In order to restrict the possible combinations of concepts and relations, canonical graphs will be de ned as being graphs that obey certain selectional constraints. Towards that goal, we start with the de nition of canonical formation rules, which are identical to Assumption 3.4.3 except that it is now possible to restrict relation types. For a more detailed study of the canonical formation rules, especially the join operation, the reader is referred to 2].
Assumption 28. Using these rules compositionally, it is possible to derive a conceptual graph u from a set of conceptual graphs S. However, for the de nition of canonical graph (Assumption 36) it is important to guarantee that every graph of S is used in the derivation of u. For that purpose, we adopt the notion of derivation from 11] but we call it \canonical derivation", a term that is used in 11] to denote the derivation from a speci c set (the canonical basis). We feel that our nomenclature is more in accordance with 16] and the common usage in the Conceptual Graphs community.
De nition 29. A canonical derivation of a conceptual graph G is a directed acyclic graph whose nodes are conceptual graphs such that G is the only sink; any node is either a source or it has exactly one or two predecessors; if node v has exactly one predecessor v 0 then v is a simpli cation or a restriction of v 0 ; if node v has exactly two predecessors v 0 and v 00 then v is a join of v 0 and v 00 .
De nition 30. A conceptual graph u is canonically derivable from a set S of conceptual graphs if there is a canonical derivation of u whose sources are elements of S.
The canonical formation rules induce a further structuring mechanism, this time between conceptual graphs. Notice that Theorem 3.5.2 states that the relation between graphs is antisymmetric, which is not true. In fact it is possible for two di erent graphs to be related to each other as Gerard Ellis and others 2] pointed out. Thus the notion of \equivalent graph" is necessary.
De nition 31. A conceptual graph u is a specialization of a conceptual graph v and con- De nition 34. Two graphs are comparable if one of them is a specialization of the other.
In 16] the canonical basis is de ned as the initial set of conceptual graphs to which the canonical formation rules may be applied. All graphs thus obtained are called canonical graphs. Furthermore, in the Conceptual Catalog 16, Appendix B] a canonical graph is assigned to each concept and relation type, but this is not part of the formal de nition of a canonical basis (Assumption 3.4.5). This led the Conceptual Structures community to use the term \canonical graph" in two di erent senses: (1) a graph that is derivable from the canonical basis, and (2) the graph that is associated to some type in the canonical basis. Of course, these two senses are not incompatible, since (2) implies (1). However, to make the distinction clear we will use the term \base graph" for sense (2) . 3 There is another dual view as Mark Willems pointed out. On one hand base graphs represent selectional constraints on the links between relations and concepts. On the other hand they state the mandatory \arguments" of each type (e.g. the concept type GIVE should involve two PERSONs and an OBJECT). We feel that this latter view is more appropriate of a lexicon.
We therefore use base graphs only for selectional restrictions. As concepts may be linked to many di erent relations, we take an approach similar to 2, 11] and only impose constraints on the relations. In other words, for each relation type there is at most one base graph associated with it, stating the maximal concepts that may be attached to it. Furthermore, if a relation r is a subrelation of r , then their base graphs must be related, as r can't be attached to more general concepts than r 0 .
Also, if an individual marker m conforms to type t, it makes no sense to say that the graph consisting only of concept ht; mi is non-canonical. By the canonical formation rules, ht; mi is derivable from ht 0 ; i where t 0 is the top element of the type hierarchy to which t belongs. Therefore, all concept types of the same hierarchy will be associated to the same base graph.
Assumption 35. A canon is a tuple hT C ; T RC ; T R ; M; ; ; ::; B; i such that the rst seven elements satisfy all the assumptions given before, the canonical basis B is a nite set of conceptual graphs (formed from the types and individuals given by the canon), and the surjective function : S n i=1 T i S m j=1 R j S m+1 k=1 R k ! B associates to each type its base graph. Furthermore, the following conditions must be met:
any concept occurring in the graphs of B satis es :: ; each graph of B has at most one relation, and each relation type occurs at most once in the graphs of B; for any relation type t, the graph (t) has a relation r such that type(r) t; 8L 2 T C T RC 8t 2 L (t) = hfhtop(L); ig;;; ;i; 8r; r 0 2 S m+1 k=1 R k r r 0 ) (r) (r 0 ).
Finally, we can de ne a canonical graph g as a graph that has been derived from all the base graphs of the concepts and relations that appear in g.
Assumption 36. A conceptual graph u is canonical with respect to a given canon hT C ; T RC ; T R ; M; ; ; ::; B; i if there is a derivation for u whose sources S are members of B satisfying the following conditions:
for each relation r of u, (t) 2 S for every t type(r); for each concept c of u, (type(c)) 2 S; no other graph belongs to S.
It should be obvious that Proposition 37. Given a canon C with canonical basis B, every graph of B is canonical with respect to C.
Conclusions
In our opinion, there are several strong reasons for having a formal speci cation of Conceptual Structures Theory, and therefore this paper presented a precise account of its basic notions, especially regarding higher-order types, as they enable conceptual graphs to be used as the meta-language. The proposed formalization, which incorporates some of the recently published (informal) ideas, is highly structured: types, referents, and therefore concepts and relations, are all organized into lattices. This makes the theory simpler, more regular, and more elegant. It also allowed us to extend the restriction operation to relation types. Furthermore, our formalization clari es several relationships, as between referents and types, and between the denotation function and the conformity relation. Finally, the meaning of canonical graph as a selectional constraint has been precisely de ned. The basic notions presented in this paper will be implemented in the second version of the Conceptual Graph Tools 21] . Furthermore, they can be combined with a mechanism to structure knowledge bases as presented in 20] .
